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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Public sentiment regarding the violent nature of America’s adolescents has 
reached a boiling point.1  Critics contend that the youth of today are not just 
committing more crimes, but that their very nature has somehow changed in the past 
twenty to thirty years from mischievous, young troublemakers to violent hardened 
criminals.2 As a result of such hasty categorizations, our vocabulary includes all new 
phrases such as “superpredators,”3  “youth violence epidemic,”4 and “violent new 
breed.”5 
                                                                
1Timothy W. Maier & Michael Rust, A Decline in Crime?, INSIGHT MAG., Apr. 27, 1998, 
available in 1998 WL 9105395. 
2143 CONG. REC. S145 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1997) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft). 
3Bernadine Dohrn & Steven Drizin, A Second Chance: Juvenile Delinquents Who 
Transformed Themselves and History, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 4, 1999, available in 1999 WL 
2849407. 
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State policy-makers have responded to such public opinions by enacting 
legislation that makes it easier to try juveniles as adults.6  These statutes were 
intended to make sentences longer and more harsh, insuring deterrence and 
retribution for young offenders, and increased safety for society.7  Since 1992, forty-
seven states have adjusted their laws, in one way or another, to deal with the threat of 
juvenile crime.8  Of these states, forty have specifically lowered the requirements to 
transfer a juvenile to adult court.9 
Ohio’s new juvenile transfer statute became effective in 1996.10  This enactment 
lowered the age at which the state may transfer a juvenile to adult court from fifteen 
to fourteen-years-old, and broadened the situations in which transfer is mandatory.11 
The Federal government responded similarly by changing its laws in 1994, 
making it possible to transfer a thirteen-year-old to adult court.12  Additionally, 
legislation has been recently proposed that would make states eligible for federal 
funding based upon enactment of laws mandating transfer of fifteen-year-olds to 
adult courts for certain offenses.13  Other federal legislative proposals suggest that 
there be fewer restrictions on incarcerating juveniles with adults.14 
The response of the states and the Federal Government in enacting tougher 
juvenile laws was inappropriate for a number of reasons.  First, evidence indicates 
that the rate of juvenile crime has been decreasing dramatically for the last several 
                                                          
4DeWayne Wickham, To Save Country, Save Kids from Violence, AIDS, USA TODAY, 
May 26, 1998, available in 1998 WL 5725647. 
5Fox Butterfield, Guns Are Blamed for ‘80s Rise in Teen Homicides “The Kids’ DNA Has 
Not Changed,” NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Dec. 10, 1998, available in 1998 WL 
16080581. 
6Ron Martz, Juvenile Crime Wave May Be Just a Ripple, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, 
Dec. 10, 1998, available in 1998 WL 16080580. 
7Eric K. Klein, Note, Dennis the Menace or Billy the Kid: An Analysis of the Role of 
Transfer to Criminal Court in Juvenile Justice, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 371, 374 (1998). 
8Steven J. Morse, Immaturity and Irresponsibility, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15, 16 
(1997). 
9PATRICK GRIFFIN ET AL., OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, 
TRYING JUVENILES AS ADULTS IN CRIMINAL COURT: AN ANALYSIS OF STATE TRANSFER 
PROVISIONS iii (1998). 
10OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.26 (West 1998). 
11Id. 
12Holly Beatty, Comment, Is the Trend to Expand Juvenile Transfer Statutes Just an Easy 
Answer to a Complex Problem?, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 979, 1007 (1995). 
13William Raspberry, GOP Cynicism on Juvenile Crime, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, 
Sept. 29, 1998, available in 1998 WL 16066142. 
14James S.  Russell, AIA, Detention Facilities: Locking Them Up Is Getting Tough the 
Best Way to Approach Prison Design? Or Should Facilities Respond to the Needs of the 
Populations Being Detained?, ARCHITECTURAL REC., Dec. 1, 1998, available in 1998 WL 
9811247. 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol47/iss4/10
1999] A CURRENT LOOK AT OHIO’S JUVENILE JUSTICE 629 
years,15 thereby eliminating the justifications for harsher penalties.  Second, treating 
juveniles as adults ignores the cognitive, emotional, and developmental differences 
between these two age groups,16 resulting in laws that do not protect society nor deter 
or rehabilitate our young offenders.  Finally, strict provisions that completely remove 
judicial discretion and mandate transfer by statute may result in an unreasonably 
harsh sentence for an undeserving offender. 
This Note takes a closer look at the problems associated with transferring 
juveniles to adult court by focusing on Ohio’s juvenile transfer statute.17 Part II 
begins with an analysis of the history of the juvenile court, including its 
establishment and evolution throughout time.18  It also includes an analysis of how 
the common interpretation of the original approach to juvenile crime has created an 
overly narrow view of how to deal with the problem today.19  Part III examines the 
latest crime statistics that reveal a significant drop in juvenile crime.20  This section 
also explores various alternative explanations for the apparent rise in juvenile crime 
during certain periods in the last twenty years.21  Part IV summarizes the cognitive, 
emotional, and developmental differences between juveniles and adults that justify a 
separate system for our young offenders.22  Part V analyzes the different methods 
used to transfer juveniles to adult courts, including waiver, direct file, statutory 
exclusion, and “once an adult, always an adult” provisions.23  Part VI outlines the 
1996 changes made to Ohio’s transfer statute for both discretionary and mandatory 
transfer.24  Part VII points out the problems associated with Ohio’s transfer statute 
and brings to light inadequacies common to most state statutes that make juvenile 
transfer easier.25  It also explores possible alternatives to transfer, including a 
proposal by the Ohio Criminal Sentencing Commission that suggests eliminating 
transfer and giving the juvenile court judge the ability to impose adult sentences.26 
Altogether, the most important message is that policy must be the product of well 
informed decision-making rather than merely a response to public outrage at 
                                                                
15David Westphal, Murder Takes a Holiday: Violent Crime Rate Falls Again in U.S., 
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Nov. 23, 1998, available in 1998 WL 22726204. 
16Elizabeth S. Scott, et al., Evaluating Adolescent Decision Making in Legal Contexts, 19 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 221, 222 (1995). 
17See discussion infra Parts VI, VII. 
18See discussion infra Part II. 
19See discussion infra Part II. 
20See discussion infra Part III. 
21See discussion infra Part III. 
22See discussion infra Part IV. 
23See discussion infra Part V. 
24See discussion infra Part VI. 
25See discussion infra Part VII. 
26Mark Tatge, Convicted 10-Year-Olds Could Face Prison Terms, PLAIN DEALER 
(Cleveland), Dec. 24, 1998, at 1A. 
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statistics that are largely blown out of proportion.27  Adolescents are different than 
adults, and laws must reflect consideration of what makes them different if any goals 
of punishment are to be achieved.28 
II.  THE ORIGINS OF JUVENILE COURT 
There are great differences of opinion regarding the proper goals of a juvenile 
court system and the most effective ways to accomplish them.  The following 
sections describe how this country has, at different stages of our history, 
experimented with different policies and procedures with respect to juveniles.  Each 
section will explore different explanations for what may have been the driving force 
behind reform and how the juvenile justice system developed through time evolving 
into the system we have today. 
A.  The Traditional Approach  
A history of the American Juvenile Justice System can be summarized in two 
phases.  During the first phase, the “Progressives” formed the original juvenile court 
100 years ago, founded upon the goals of treatment and rehabilitation.29  This was 
accomplished through informal procedures where the juvenile court judge had 
abundant discretion regarding what was best for the child.30  The second phase 
occurred in the 1960s, when the Supreme Court changed the whole nature of the 
system by granting juveniles procedural due process rights.31  The result was a more 
punitive system that totally resembled the adult criminal court.32 
At common law, children over seven years old were treated as adults.33  The child 
was subjected to “arrest, trial, and in theory, to punishment like adult offenders” 
because the state was not thought to have the authority to grant juveniles different 
procedural protections.34 
A new movement, begun by the Progressives in the late 1800s, sought to treat 
juveniles differently than adults.35  Their philosophy was that delinquency was more 
the result of social ills, such as poverty, rather than the child’s moral depravity.36  
Treatment and rehabilitation became the strategy in dealing with this group of 
individuals.37  Punishment was reserved only for those who were old enough to be 
                                                                
27See discussion infra Part III. 
28See discussion infra Part IV. 
29Beatty, supra note 12, at 981. 
30Beatty, supra note 12, at 983. 
31Beatty, supra note 12, at 986. 
32Beatty, supra note 12, at 984-85. 
33In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967). 
34Id. 
35Beatty, supra note 12, at 981. 
36Beatty, supra note 12, at 981. 
37Beatty, supra note 12, at 981. 
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held fully responsible for their wrongs.38  This movement led to the establishment of 
the first juvenile court in Illinois one hundred years ago.39 
In juvenile court, when a child was suspected of committing a crime, the juvenile 
court would determine whether he or she was delinquent instead of guilty.40  This 
was a civil proceeding without the “rigidity of the adult criminal system.”41  The 
state, acting within its parens patriae capacity, was seeking to treat and not to punish 
the young offender; consequently, there was no need for procedural protections.42  
Additionally, there were no lawyers present,43 and the judge, instead of being trained 
in the law,44 was to be versed in the subject of child welfare.45   
An intended benefit of juvenile court proceedings was less formality.46  This 
afforded the judge flexibility to take into consideration the individual differences in 
each case and evaluate the needs of each young offender in accordance with the 
judge’s own discretion.47  An unintended effect of the juvenile court system was that 
over the years following its inception, the original goal of treatment slowly gave way 
to punishment.48  By the 1960s, the purpose of the juvenile court seemed to mirror 
that of the adult criminal court; however, procedural protections remained 
nonexistent.49  What had formed was a “gap between the originally benign 
conception of the system and its realities.”50 
The Supreme Court, confronted with the unfairness of a juvenile system aimed at 
punishment without providing procedural protections, began affording some 
safeguards in Kent v. United States in 1966.51  However, with these procedural 
                                                                
38Beatty, supra note 12, at 981. 
39Martin L. Forst & Martha-Elin Blomquist, Cracking Down on Juveniles: The Changing 
Ideology of Youth Corrections, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 323, 324 (1991). 
40RALPH REISNER & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM: 
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ASPECTS 692 (2d ed. 1990). 
41Id. at 693. 
42In re Gault, 387 U.S.  1, 15-16 (1967). 
43REISNER & SLOBOGIN, supra note 40, at 692. 
44REISNER & SLOBOGIN, supra note 40, at 692. 
45Klein, supra note 7, at 377. 
46Beatty, supra note 12, at 983. 
47Susan R. Bell, Comment & Casenote, Ohio Gets Tough on Juvenile Crime: An Analysis 
of Ohio's 1996 Amendments Concerning the Bindover of Violent Juvenile Offenders to the 
Adult System and Related Legislation, 66 U. CIN L. REV. 207, 209 (1997). 
48Beatty, supra note 12, at 983. 
49Beatty, supra note 12, at 983. 
50Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528 (1975). 
51Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).  See also Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 
541, 555 (1966). 
While there can be no doubt of the original laudable purpose of the juvenile courts, 
studies and critiques in recent years raise serious questions as to whether actual 
performance measures well enough against theoretical purpose to make tolerable the 
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1999
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safeguards came a shift in focus from the individual offender to the underlying 
offense that was committed.52  The obvious result was even less focus on treatment 
and rehabilitation. 
At the age of 16 and while still on probation, Morris Kent was apprehended by 
the police for housebreaking, robbery, and rape.53  After two days and more than 
twelve hours of interrogation, he admitted to the alleged crimes as well as other 
similar offenses.54  His mother was informed of his arrest the day after Kent was 
apprehended.55  Her lawyer promptly objected to him being tried in adult court.56 
For one week after Kent’s initial arrest, there was no arraignment or 
determination of probable cause.57  Kent’s attorney made several motions, including 
one for access to his social service file, all of which were never ruled on by the 
court.58  The judge transferred the case to U.S. District Court after conducting a 
purported “full investigation.”59  The sentence Kent received was thirty to ninety 
years in prison.60  The U.S. Supreme Court, stating that “the admonition to function 
in a parental relationship is not an invitation to procedural arbitrariness,” held that a 
hearing is necessary before juvenile court jurisdiction may be waved.61  The Court 
also held that counsel is entitled access to records, and the juvenile court judge must 
state the reasons underlying the transfer to adult court.62  Finally, in the appendix to 
the opinion, the Court listed a number of factors a judge should consider before 
transferring a case to adult court.63  Such factors include the nature of the offense 
(seriousness, violent), type of offense (against person or property), prosecutive merit, 
maturity of the offender, previous record, and amenability to rehabilitation.64 
A more profound procedural change in the juvenile system occurred one year 
later in In re Gault.65  Unbeknownst to his mother, Gerald Francis Gault was taken 
into custody for making phone calls to a neighbor, Mrs. Cook, of the “irritatingly 
                                                          
immunity of the process from the reach of constitutional guarantees applicable to 
adults.  Id. 
52Beatty, supra note 12, at 985. 
53Kent, 383 U.S. at 543. 




58Kent, 383 U.S. at 546. 
59Id. 
60Id. at 550. 
61Id. at 555. 
62Id. at 555-57. 
63Kent, 383 U.S. at 566-67. 
64Id. 
65387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
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offensive, adolescent, sex variety.”66  At an informal hearing, no one was sworn in, 
there was no sign of Mrs. Cook, no counsel, and no transcript;67 furthermore, the 
Gaults did not receive notice of his hearing until two months later.68  After Gerald 
was questioned, the judge said he would think about the situation, and then 
proceeded to send him back to a detention facility for four more days.69  At the next 
hearing, at which Mrs. Cook was also not present, Gerald was sentenced to six years 
at a state industrial school.70 
In response to this “unbridled discretion,” the Supreme Court awarded 
substantive due process rights to Gerald and future offenders involved in juvenile 
proceedings.71  These protections include the right to notice of charges, counsel, 
confrontation, privilege against self-incrimination, cross-examination, appellate 
review, and a transcript of the proceedings.72 
This case marked a dramatic shift in juvenile law because the proceedings came 
to resemble a regular criminal trial.73  They had become formal criminal proceedings, 
with a focus on the offense and punishment, instead of informal, civil proceedings 
focused on the individual offender and the treatment best suited for his or her 
particular needs.74 
The trend to grant procedural protections continued in In re Winship.75  This case 
involved a juvenile who was convicted and sentenced to eighteen months in a 
training school, subject to six years of annual extensions, for stealing $112 from a 
woman’s locker.76  His guilt was determined only by a preponderance of evidence.77  
Consequently, the Supreme Court held that when a juvenile is on trial for a criminal 
charge, guilt must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.78 
The Supreme Court made one final step in its move to make the juvenile court 
identical to the adult court in 1975.79  In Breed v. Jones, the juvenile was 
apprehended for armed robbery.80  While he was detained, the juvenile court held 
                                                                
66Id. at 4. 
67Id. at 5. 
68Id. 
69Id. at 6. 
70Gault, 387 U.S. at 7. 
71Id. at 17. 
72Id. at 31-59. 
73Beatty, supra note 12, at 983. 
74Beatty, supra note 12, at 983. 
75In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
76Id. at 360. 
77Id. 
78Id. at 365. 
79Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975). 
80Id. at 521. 
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several hearings.81  At the dispositional hearing, Breed was found unfit for treatment 
as a juvenile and transferred to adult court where he was tried again.82  Despite the 
fact that he was never truly sentenced in juvenile court, the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that the juvenile was twice put in jeopardy when he was sent to the adult court to be 
tried again.83  The Court stated that “the purpose of the Double Jeopardy clause is to 
require that he be subject to the experience only once for the same offence.”84 
In an opinion reflecting a desire to maintain at least one aspect of the informal 
juvenile proceeding, the Supreme Court, in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, refused to 
extend the right to trial by jury in juvenile proceedings.85  The Court felt it would 
become too adversarial and would completely cripple the judge’s flexibility in 
determining the proper punishment for individual offenders.86 
In sum, history shows that the lofty goals of the original juvenile advocates were 
forever changed when the Supreme Court decided to grant procedural protections to 
juveniles; however, this interpretation raises questions as to how procedural 
safeguards (even if identical to those of the adult criminal court) changed the whole 
philosophy from treatment to punishment.  Conversely, history demonstrates that the 
focus underlying the juvenile court may actually have changed before the Supreme 
Court decided to grant juveniles such protections.  It remains unclear, however, as to 
why society turned away from reforming its wayward youths.  The following two 
sections will point to other forces that may have pushed this change in philosophy 
and explore the possibility that procedural informality was not necessary to maintain 
the identity of the juvenile court.87 
B.  The Cyclical Approach 
Authors Jeffrey M. Jenson and Mathew O. Howard maintain that the juvenile 
justice policy has repeatedly gone in cycles from the goal of rehabilitation to 
punishment, starting in 1825 with the New York House of Refuge.88  This institution 
was created upon the belief that juveniles should be treated differently than adult 
criminals and separated from them in their own system of rehabilitation.89  As 
society began to feel that this approach was too lenient, institutions like the House of 
Refuge evolved into places resembling adult prisons with little emphasis on 
rehabilitation.90  
                                                                
81Id. at 521-25. 
82Id. at 524. 
83Id. at 541. 
84Breed, 421 U.S. at 530. 
85McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971). 
86REISNER & SLOBOGIN, supra note 40, at 694. 
87See discussion infra Parts B, C. 
88See Jeffrey M. Jenson & Matthew O. Howard, Youth Crime, Public Policy, and Practice 
in the Juvenile Justice System: Recent Trends and Needed Reforms, SOC. WORK, July 1, 1998, 
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According to Jenson and Howard, another movement emerged in the late 1800s 
resulting in the establishment of the first juvenile court in Illinois in 1899.91  Its goals 
of reform were similar to those that led to the creation of the House of Refuge.92  
Over a period of sixty years, society began to feel that this system was “ineffective in 
reducing crime” and unfair in that it did not afford juveniles the same legal rights as 
adult criminals.93 
In 1966, the Supreme Court began a third reform movement, based upon the 
belief that “the child receives the worst of both worlds. . . neither the protections 
accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for 
children.”94  Beginning with Kent v. United States, the Court decided a series of 
cases granting procedural due process rights to juveniles.95  At the same time, 
smaller, less restrictive, community-based institutions became the alternative to the 
large, overcrowded, and ineffective custodial institutions.96  Underlying this reform 
were the goals of treatment, rehabilitation, and decriminalization of delinquency.97  
As a result of an increase in violent juvenile crime in the mid-1980s and early 
1990s, and a perception that this country is too easy on its juveniles, the focus has 
again changed back to punitive sanctions in the form of harsher sentences and easier 
transfers to adult courts.98  Jenson and Howard argue that history shows that proper 
policy should have a balanced focus between “prevention, rehabilitation, and 
punishment.”99  A focus on only one of these goals has repeatedly led to 
unimpressive results.100 
C.  The Real Reformers 
The foregoing sections of this Note have expounded on the position that the early 
reform movements that brought about the New York House of Refuge and the first 
juvenile court were periods of benevolent social change with regard to juvenile 
justice.101  Numerous scholarly commentaries support this position.102  Author 
                                                                
91Id. 
92Id. 
93See Jenson & Howard, supra note 88. 
94Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966). 
95See Jenson & Howard, supra note 88. 
96Jenson & Howard, supra note 88. 
97Jenson & Howard, supra note 88. 
98Jenson & Howard, supra note 88. 
99Jenson & Howard, supra note 88. 
100Jenson & Howard, supra note 88. 
101See discussion supra Parts II A, B. 
102In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15 (1967).  “The early reformers were appalled by adult 
procedures and penalties, and by the fact that children could be given long prison sentences 
and mixed in jail with hardened criminals.”  Id.  See also Beatty, supra note 12, at 985; Florst 
& Blomquist, supra note 39, at 325; Klein, supra note 7, at 376; Bell, supra note 47, at 209; 
Eric J. Fritsch & Craig Hemmens, An Assessment of Legislative Approaches to the Problem of 
Serious Juvenile Crime: A Case study of Texas 1973-1995, 230 AM. J. CRIM. L. 563, 564 
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636 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:627 
Sanford J. Fox takes the opposite view, arguing that the original reformers, 
beginning with those that founded the House of Refuge in 1825, may not have been 
the “child savers”103 as they are remembered today.104 
The New York House of Refuge, initially a homeless shelter for poor children, 
developed into an institution designed to intervene in the lives of young offenders 
and to isolate those convicted of minor offenses from the corrupting influences of 
adult offenders.105  The main focus in 1825 was on those charged with minor 
offenses who could still be saved.106  Those convicted of more serious offenses were 
treated as adults.107 
There were some negative sides to this institution as well.  Because of the 
conditions that existed on the inside, juries often would rather let a child go free than 
send him away to the House of Refuge.108  Further, severe corporal punishments and 
little or no religious expression for non-Protestants were common.109 
Fox demonstrates that the goals the reformers so outwardly promoted were 
neither unique to the juvenile justice system, nor were they always realized in 
practice.110  Thirty years before the House of Refuge was established, retribution was 
replaced by the goals of deterrence and reformation in all areas of criminal justice.111  
As an alternative to corporal punishment, the homeless and criminals were locked up 
for their own well being.112  Prisons soon became overcrowded and rioting 
occasionally resulted.113  The House of Refuge was part of a larger response to 
society’s displeasure for the entire system, and its feelings that it actually promoted 
crime.114  The solution was to create institutions where life was uncomfortable and 
treatment was severe in hopes that it would further deter criminal acts and “possibly 
motivate the poor out of their poverty.”115  Courts ignored the real nature of these 
institutions so long as the “declared purposes were morally and socially 
acceptable.”116 
                                                          
(Special Issue: Juvenile Justice and the Criminal Law 1996); Jacqueline Cuncannan, Note, 
Only When They're Bad: The Rights and Responsibilities of Our Children, 51 WASH. U. J. 
URB. & CONTEMP. L. 273, 278 (1997). 
103Bell, supra note 47, at 208. 
104See generally Fox, supra note 5. 
105Fox, supra note 5, at 1189. 
106Fox, supra note 5, at 1189. 
107Fox, supra note 5, at 1189. 
108Fox, supra note 5, at 1194. 
109Fox, supra note 5, at 1196. 
110Fox, supra note 5, at 1196. 
111Fox, supra note 5, at 1196. 
112Fox, supra note 5, at 1196. 
113Fox, supra note 5, at 1197. 
114Fox, supra note 5, at 1197. 
115Fox, supra note 5, at 1200. 
116Fox, supra note 5, at 1206. 
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Fox also contends that there are myths concerning the real purpose behind the 
creation of the first juvenile court.117  The 1899 Juvenile Court Act contained a 
provision that referred to “care, custody and discipline.”118  The traditional approach 
to history interprets this as proof of this court’s non-punitive, protectionist 
philosophy.119  In fact, that philosophy was never expressly stated, and the words 
“care, custody and discipline” merely referred to placing deviant children in foster 
homes rather than larger institutions.120 
Finally, Fox contends that the creation of the first juvenile court was not a push 
to change juvenile court procedures.121  Before 1899, juveniles were tried in inferior 
courts with the same type of informality and lack of procedural protections that are 
so often accredited to the first juvenile court.122  In fact, courts were finding that 
children were being sent to reform schools based on broad statutes and too much 
discretion that infringed on the constitutional rights of the child.123 
The theory underlying the traditional approach is the idea that procedural 
informality is essential to maintaining the goal of rehabilitation in the juvenile 
system.  This narrow view of the function of the juvenile court has resulted in a lack 
of experimentation with juvenile court procedures.  Consequently, transfer to adult 
court, where all protections were available, was perceived as the only way to make 
serious offenders truly accountable for their actions.  A closer look at the history of 
the juvenile court reveals that procedural informality may not have been intended or 
even necessary to achieving a rehabilitative goal.  With this in mind, policy makers 
are free to explore the possibility of combining procedural fairness with 
rehabilitation. 
To develop sound policy, a close, realistic look at the problem is absolutely 
necessary.  This requires an examination of the state of juvenile crime today, 
specifically, a look at whether juvenile crime really is worse than it was twenty years 
ago. 
III.  JUVENILE CRIME TODAY 
The murders, robbers, rapists, and drug dealers of yesteryear were 
typically adults.  Now they are typically juveniles.  As the age of these 
criminal predators becomes younger with each passing year, so does the 
age of their victims . . . .  The rate at which juveniles 14 to 17 years old 
were arrested for murder grew by twenty two percent from 1990 to 1994 
and the problem is going to get worse, much worse. . . .  We now have a 
new category of offenders that requires a different, tougher approach.  In 
short, we have criminals in our midst-young criminals-not juvenile 
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pranksters and truants. . . .  The legislation introduced today takes a 
common sense approach in dealing with the current epidemic of juvenile 
violence.  It would help the states make urban, suburban, and rural 
communities safe once again.124 
Sensational speakers, like Senator Ashcroft above, and isolated instances, such as 
the murder of fellow students and teacher by eleven and thirteen-year-old boys125 
lend to the current paranoia regarding the level of juvenile crime today.126  The 
typical reaction of harsher penalties and adult trials seems to be consistent among 
policy makers.127  This section examines the facts of juvenile crime in the last twenty 
years.  It explores the increase in juvenile crime during the late 1980s and early 
1990s and its subsequent decrease since that period.  It will also show the causes of 
the misperceived rate of juvenile crime today and some alternative explanations for 
the apparent jump in juvenile crime during the late 1980s and early 1990s.  This 
analysis will demonstrate that despite instances like the school shooting in 
Columbine High School, the crime problem among this group of offenders may not 
be as severe as it seems. 
A.  Statistical Analysis 
The FBI Uniform Crime Reports, Crime Victimization Survey, and Bureau of 
Justice statistics indicate a jump in violent juvenile crime between the early 1970s 
and early 1990s.128  During this period, non-homicide offenses significantly 
increased.129  The rate of robbery increased sixty-four percent for young offenders 
aged sixteen to nineteen.130  For that same age group, there was thirty-two percent 
increase in aggravated assault as well as a rise in simple assault.131  The amount of 
rape offenses committed by offender’s aged thirteen to seventeen increased by thirty-
two percent from 1980 to 1992.132 
When non-homicide offenses such as rape, robbery, and aggravated assault are 
combined with homicide, a broader picture of the overall juvenile crime problem is 
presented.  The National Criminal Victimization Survey, produced by the United 
States Department of Justice, shows that the number of offenders ages twelve to 
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seventeen was 921,000 in 1973 dropping to all time low of 618,000 in 1986.133  The 
rate then increased dramatically in 1993 to 1,108,000 offenders.134  The number of 
offenders ages eighteen and over increased as well over this twenty-year period,135 
revealing that crime for all ages was on the rise. 
The statistics that require the most attention are the homicide rates.  They have 
shown the most dramatic variations over the last twenty years and are the most 
accurately measured criminal offense.136  For offenders age fifteen through nineteen, 
the homicide rate rose two hundred twenty percent between 1970 through 1991.137  
From 1986, the year of the least amount of violent crime, through 1993, the year 
with the worst showing, the rate of juvenile homicide tripled.138  The Bureau of 
Justice statistics maps out juvenile homicide offending rates per 100,000 starting in 
1976.139  For offenders aged fourteen to seventeen, the homicide offending rate 
increased from 10.2 to 30.2 in 1993.140 
All of these statistics show that what Senator Ashcroft and other sensationalists 
said about a surge in violent crime were partially correct.  What seriously 
undermines the Senator’s speech to the President in 1997 is the fact that there was an 
eighteen percent drop in overall juvenile crime between 1994 and 1996.141  For 
crimes of rape, robbery, aggravated assault, and homicide combined, the number of 
offenders also dropped drastically in 1994.142  This trend continued into 1997 when, 
aside from the five year span in the late 1980s, the number of offenders fell to the 
lowest level since 1973.143 
The declining rate of homicides since 1994 is even more impressive.  For 
offenders under fourteen years of age, the homicide offending rate is the same as it 
was twenty years ago, with very little, if any variation over the years.144  For 
offenders aged fourteen to seventeen, however, the offending rate has varied 
substantially in twenty years.145  In 1976, the rate of juveniles aged fourteen to 
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seventeen who committed homicide was 10.6 per 100,000 juveniles.  This rose to 
12.9 in 1980, dropped to an all time low of 8.5 in 1984, and increased dramatically 
every year until the number was 30.2 in 1993.146  Many policy-makers focus on the 
period between 1984 and 1993 when pushing for tougher laws.147  The problem is 
that homicide rates may be misinterpreted if the only comparison is between the year 
with the highest rate of homicides and the year with the lowest.148  A look at a larger 
span of time will reveal the fact that crime goes in cycles149 and that the number of 
homicide offenders in 1997 was almost half the number in 1993.150 
The perception of increased juvenile violence has persisted despite the fact that 
statistics tell us differently.151  An explanation for this may be that society is simply 
more privy to information concerning tragic events across the country.  Intense 
media coverage of horrible, but isolated instances is presented with gory detail in 
newspapers, magazines, and news television programs almost immediately after they 
occur.152  As a result of this coverage, the public believes that the real world reflects 
what the media presents.153  The President spoke of these events in his State of the 
Union address: “Last year we were horrified and heartbroken by the tragic killings in 
Jonesboro, Paducah, Pearl, Edinboro, [and] Springfield.”154 
B.  The Perception of Rising Juvenile Crime 
The statistics previously discussed demonstrate that crime goes in cycles and that 
focusing on one particular period of time will produce an inaccurate picture of the 
real state of the problem.  However, the reason behind increased crime rates during 
certain periods, particularly the late 1980s and early 1990s has yet to be explored.  
The following are alternative explanations for the seemingly uncontestable rise in 
juvenile crime during that period.  The following arguments will address the role of 
firearms, police practices, and drugs on the overall juvenile crime rate. 
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Of the four violent crimes, homicide, aggravated assault, rape, and robbery, only 
the first two have really shown to have increased during the period from the mid-
1980s to the early 1990s, according to Franklin E. Zimring, author of American 
Youth Violence.155  Rape and robbery committed by juveniles, on the other hand, 
have consistently fluctuated up and down in small variations over many years.156  
The rise in homicide rates from 1976 to 1996 present a different problem.  “The 
most important reason for the sharp escalation in homicide was an escalating volume 
of fatal attacks with firearms. . . .”157  During the same period of time, the amount of 
murders committed without a firearm remained stable;158 therefore, the rise in total 
homicides is directly related to the rise in murders committed with a gun.159  
This does not, however, signify a more violent type of offender.160  Nor does it 
show that the amount of attacks have significantly increased, or that the intentions of 
the perpetrator have become more evil.161  Actually, a very small portion of juvenile 
offenders began to use guns during that time.162  As a result of the increase in the 
likelihood of death when a gun is used, a very small number of offenders raised the 
total number of homicides.163  The steady rate of knife related homicides further 
supports the claim that juveniles are not more violent today.164 
Finally, aggravated assaults have increased dramatically along with the number 
of homicides.165  At first this does not seem to go well with the argument that a small 
group of juveniles have simply changed their weapon of choice.  But, as Zimring 
suggests, “the increasing arrest rates in the younger age bracket for assault was not a 
change in the behavior of young offenders but a change in the classification of 
attacks that are close to the line that separates simple from aggravated assaults.”166  
The change in the way police officers looked at aggravated assault resulted in higher 
offending rates for those over twenty-five as well.167  All of this suggests that 
juveniles are simply not committing more violent acts than before, rather, changes 
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that affect a small number of juveniles can have a significant impact on the overall 
rate of crime. 
Instead of arguing that juveniles are more violent today, Henry H.  Brownstein 
blames the rise in violent crime between 1985 and 1994 on the rise of the crack 
cocaine market.168  The increased production of cocaine during the mid-1980s 
resulted in greater availability, lower cost, and higher purity.169  With the increase in 
supply, there was a need for a larger market.170  By transforming a small amount of 
regular, expensive, cocaine into a large amount of cheaper crack cocaine, the market 
was extended to those who could not afford it before.171  
At first, the crack market was anything but “organized” crime.172  Since little 
money was needed to begin dealing, and users commonly made many stops to their 
own personal suppliers (small amounts sold and short lasting effects), a very 
competitive atmosphere with many different sellers was created.173  “The earliest 
crack markets were dominated by young, inexperienced individuals. . . .”174  In 
addition to this competitive and volatile market was the increased availability of 
automatic weapons.175  This lethal mixture resulted in an increase in homicide 
rates.176  After a few years, as the crack market became more organized, the rate of 
juvenile homicides substantially decreased.177 
It makes sense that the public may have some misconceptions about the real state 
of juvenile crime as it exists today, especially in light of the fact that there seemed to 
be an increase in violent juvenile crime between 1986 and 1994.  However, it does 
not require a great deal of effort to realize that the figures may be misleading and 
that there are other factors that contribute to the problem.  It is the responsibility of 
policy-makers to base their decisions upon sound judgment and analysis of the actual 
problem rather than to play on the sentiments of those that elect them.  Speeches like 
Senator Ashcroft’s, cited at the beginning of this section, perpetuate the myth that 
juveniles are different or more violent than they were twenty years ago.  Since 
juvenile crime has recently decreased overall, we owe it to ourselves to at explore the 
reasons why. 
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IV.  THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN JUVENILES AND ADULTS 
Adolescents are not permitted to drink, smoke, gamble, or drive until they reach 
certain ages.  They may not even be permitted to walk the streets at certain times.  
Throughout history, juveniles have been treated differently under the law in terms of 
their freedoms, responsibilities, and culpability.  The Supreme Court sets out the 
justification for this treatment in Thompson v. Oklahoma, when it decided that 
executing a person under 16 years of age was “cruel and unusual punishment.”178 
The Court has already endorsed the proposition that less culpability 
should attach to a crime committed by a juvenile than to a comparable 
crime committed by an adult.  The basis for this conclusion is too obvious 
to require extended explanation.  Inexperience, less education, and less 
intelligence make the teenager less able to evaluate the consequences of 
his or her conduct while at the same time he or she is much more apt to be 
motivated by mere emotion or peer pressure than is an adult.  The reasons 
why juveniles are not trusted with the privileges and responsibilities of an 
adult also explain why their irresponsible conduct is not as morally 
reprehensible as that of an adult.179 
The following section will explain the cognitive, developmental, and emotional 
differences between adults and juveniles that justify a separate system of justice.  
This section will help clarify why treating juveniles as adults will only hinder the 
achievement of any goal of punishment. 
It has been argued that by the age of fourteen, the highest level of cognitive 
ability has been achieved.180  At this age, the young person can for the first time think 
in abstract ways.181  This is measured by the person’s ability to understand different 
alternatives and their consequences.182  Measuring only cognitive development is 
usually undertaken in structured settings with few, if any, variables and is thus not a 
good indicator of real life capabilities.183 
In the real world, this new way of thinking can actually have negative effects on 
one who is just learning to master it.184  The fact that the adolescent mind has 
physically developed to that of an adult does not mean their skills are equal.185  
Adolescents gain the ability to hold many alternatives in mind, but have little 
experience in making decisions and a lack of understanding of their own feelings; 
therefore, making decisions can be a truly stressful experience.186 
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In addition to cognitive development, other factors such as the influence of 
parents and peers, tendency to disregard risk, and limited perspective of the future, 
can affect the way adolescents make decisions.187  All of these elements should be 
taken into account when determining how to appropriately address the underlying 
causes of juvenile delinquency. 
The second ten years of life is a time of intense identity development.188  
Adolescents tend to compare themselves to others and measure their own actions 
against those around them, namely their peers.189  As a result, factors like the need 
for acceptance or peer pressure may affect how decisions are made.190  The effects of 
these forces seem to be the strongest at age fourteen and slowly diminish until the 
completion of adolescence.191 
Another typical result of this insecurity in adolescents is the formation of what 
one author has termed the “patchwork self.”192  This occurs when a young person, in 
order to adapt to situations which may be unfamiliar or uncomfortable, creates a 
personality that is a conglomeration of other people’s “feelings thoughts and beliefs” 
in order to blend in.193  This type of person is more susceptible to the influence of 
others, and has more difficulty learning from experiences and developing a solid 
identity.194 
Many young people also lack the ability to fully appreciate the negative impact 
their actions may have on their futures.195  This may explain why a young person 
may take the immediate gain of committing a criminal act or quitting school while 
ignoring the possibility of many years in prison or an undesirable job.  Other 
disadvantages of youth are inexperience and lack of knowledge.196  A young person 
may not realize the true nature of the consequences of his or her actions (horrible 
conditions of prison life), even if perfectly aware that crime could result in being sent 
to prison.  The ability to take future repercussions into account develops throughout 
the teenage years and continues “at least into the early twenties.”197  
Adolescents may also evaluate risks and benefits of certain behavior with a 
completely different system of values than adults.198  This is demonstrated by risky 
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behavior that may threaten their well being.199  Because of a strong desire for 
acceptance at this stage of life, the negative consequences of not following the crowd 
may outweigh the negative effects of drugs.200  Further, inexperience or lack of 
knowledge may result in simply not realizing negative consequences at all.201 
Certain groups of adolescents may be further affected when lack of economic 
resources or racism is combined with the characteristics of adolescents just 
described.202  Because it is a stage of life where one is struggling to form strong sense 
of self worth, having less material wealth or a different cultural background than 
others may make this process even more difficult.203  Further, poverty may inhibit 
access to proper education or may make the future appear even less important.204 
When creating policy that is designed to address the problem of juvenile crime, 
the common characteristics of adolescents must be taken into consideration.  A 
combination of learning to think in a whole new way,205 developing an identity, 
experiencing new things, and all of the confusion that goes with it are processes that 
differentiate adolescents from adults.206  These are the reasons why adolescents are 
less culpable for their decisions and why we treat them differently under the law.207  
In addition to being less culpable, most juveniles grow out of the immaturity unique 
to this stage of their lives.208  If that is the case, it makes more sense to form juvenile 
justice policy aimed at preventing them from making mistakes while young and 
irresponsible, so they can develop into productive adults.  As the next section will 
demonstrate, the trend of the vast majority of states has been to do the exact 
opposite. 
V.  METHODS OF TRANSFER 
Forty States have adjusted their transfer statutes, making it easier to try juveniles 
in adult court.209  The intended result is to insure harsh penalties, thereby satisfying 
society’s need for retribution and public safety.210  As will be discussed in later 
portions of this note, the downside of this approach is a complete abandonment of 
other goals such as rehabilitation.  This section will describe a variety of ways in 
which juveniles are transferred to the adult system.   
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A.  Waiver 
Though infrequently used until the 1960s, this method of transfer has been 
available for a number of years.211  The three types of waiver are discretionary, 
mandatory, and presumptive.212  In all three situations, a hearing must be conducted 
before the decision to transfer is made.213 
1.  Discretionary 
Discretionary waiver puts the ultimate decision to transfer in the hands of the 
juvenile court judge.214  Generally, the State must first show by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the juvenile has met certain criteria.215 Other states may require a 
higher standard of proof.216  Whether the young offender was amenable to 
rehabilitation has historically been the central focus; however, the decision to 
transfer now involves a number of determinations.217  The statutes defining these 
criteria are usually a paraphrased version of the factors set out in the appendix to 
Kent v. United States.218  Some focus on the nature of the offense (seriousness, 
premeditation, violence, whether against persons or property), other factors focus on 
the offender (sophistication, maturity, prior record, amenability to rehabilitation), 
while others focus on the protection of the community.219  States may decide to add 
or delete any of these factors.220  These broad criteria allow flexibility and room for 
individual consideration while at the same time give the juvenile court judge some 
guidance in deciding on the issue of transfer.221  If the state shows that all of the 
criteria set forth in the statute have been met, the judge may still decide that the 
situation does not warrant a transfer.222 
Most states set the age for discretionary waiver at fourteen to sixteen years old.223  
Seventeen states will allow a transfer for specific age groups (if the child is at least 
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sixteen for example) regardless of the crime that was committed.224  Vermont holds 
the record, setting the lowest age at which a juvenile may be sent to adult court under 
a discretionary waiver at ten years old.225  
2.  Mandatory 
Like discretionary waiver, mandatory waivers are commenced in the juvenile 
justice system, where the juvenile court judge must find that there was probable 
cause to believe that certain statutory criteria have been met.226  The difference from 
discretionary waiver is that the guidelines are much more specific, focusing on the 
age, particular type of crime, certain number of prior offenses as well as other 
factors.227  Once the prosecution has met its burden, the judge has no choice but to 
transfer.228  Again, the juvenile court judge still has the role of deciding whether the 
juvenile meets the criteria for mandatory transfer.229  Fourteen states use this method 
of transfer, four allow its use for property offenses, and one state, if certain 
conditions are met, requires transfer for any criminal offense.230  
3.  Presumptive 
In a presumptive waiver situation, if the juvenile falls into a certain category of 
criteria similar to that in a mandatory waiver situation, there is a rebuttable 
presumption that waiver is the appropriate course of action.231  The judge must 
transfer if the offender argues unsuccessfully that he or she is rehabilitatable.232  As 
with the previous transfer methods, it is still the juvenile court judge that makes the 
final determination.233  Fifteen states have employed this type of transfer for 
juveniles age fourteen to sixteen.234  Alaska however, attaches a presumption to 
children under fourteen for certain violent felonies such as manslaughter and assault 
in the first degree.235 
B.  Direct File and Statutory Exclusion 
These types of transfer may be grouped together because they are almost 
identical.  In both situations, the decision as to the forum in which the juvenile will 
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be tried rests in the hands of the prosecutor instead of the judge.236  There is no 
hearing on the issue of transfer in these instances because the offender is essentially 
going directly to criminal court by virtue of a statute.237  This technique is possible 
because a juvenile is not entitled to be tried in juvenile court.238  In a Direct File 
situation, the prosecutor has the option to file in criminal or juvenile court based on 
factors such as offense, age, and prior history.239  Either court has jurisdiction.240  
In states with statutory exclusion, depending on similar factors, only criminal 
court may have jurisdiction to hear the case.241  It may seem that in the latter 
situation, the prosecutor has no discretion.  However, since many offenses can fall 
under a number of classifications in terms of severity, the choice is still in the hands 
of the prosecutor.242  If a juvenile is arrested for a homicide, the prosecutor may, 
depending on the circumstances, file charges under differing degrees of murder 
thereby making the choice of forum.243 
The Direct File method of transfer exists in fifteen states.244  Statutes that 
automatically exclude juveniles from the jurisdiction of juvenile court exist in 
twenty-eight states.245  Idaho, New York, and Vermont automatically exclude a 
fourteen-year-old from the jurisdiction of juvenile court for property offenses.246  
Wisconsin will automatically try a ten-year-old in criminal court for murder.247 
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C.  “Once an Adult/Always an Adult”248 
This type of transfer requires a separate category because it is the only method 
that eliminates all discretion from both the juvenile court judge and the prosecutor.249  
If the offender has been adjudicated in a criminal court on a prior occasion, he or she 
will automatically be tried in criminal court for any subsequent offense, regardless of 
how minor it may be.250  Thirty-one states have this provision written into their 
transfer statutes.251 
Altogether, the homicide rate, while dropping rapidly in the last five years, 
increased during the period between the mid 1980s and early 1990s.252  This is often 
cited as the justification for the new transfer statutes that were enacted.253  However, 
many states (twenty-one), have statutes that transfer juveniles for non-violent 
property offenses.254  In fact, “most children sent to adult court are property 
offenders”.255  There are also many statutes that allow for transfer for any crime once 
the offender has reached a certain age.256  Some even transfer for misdemeanors.257  
Therefore, even if we are in the midst of an era of violent juveniles, it appears that 
many types of transfer statutes fail to properly address the problem. 
VI.  OHIO’S TRANSFER STATUTES 
Although “care, protection, and mental and physical development of children” 
has remained the purpose of Ohio’s juvenile system over the last thirty years, the 
laws themselves have changed.258  Ohio has addressed the problem of juvenile crime 
in a similar fashion as the forty other states, which have drafted statutes making it 
easier to try juveniles in the adult criminal system.259  Ohio has not, however, 
adopted any other form other than the waiver.260  On January 1, 1996, Ohio’s new 
juvenile crime law went into effect, changing the age and conditions under which a 
juvenile could be transferred to adult court.261 
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Under the previous law, both discretionary and mandatory transfer provisions 
existed.262  The discretionary transfer provision stated that if a juvenile allegedly 
committed a crime that would be classed as a felony if committed by an adult, the 
child could be transferred to criminal court if three elements were satisfied.263  First, 
the child had to be at least fifteen.264  Second, there had to be probable cause to 
believe the child committed the act.265  Finally, the case could be transferred if there 
were reasonable grounds to believe the child was not amenable to treatment and that 
the safety of society required it.266  Once these three elements were demonstrated, the 
decision to transfer was still up to the discretion of the juvenile court judge.267 
The second part of the old statute provided some additional factors for the judge 
to consider, such as whether the victim was over sixty-five or physically disabled or 
subject to a crime of violence.268  The Rules of Juvenile Procedure listed factors to 
provide the judge some guidance in determining whether it was reasonable to believe 
that the child was not amenable to treatment.269  Some of these factors include: age, 
mental conditions, prior record, family environment, and school record.270  Many of 
the factors resemble those listed in Kent v. United States.271  It was only mandatory 
for the judge to transfer if there was probable cause to believe that a juvenile, who 
had previously been adjudicated a delinquent child for murder, had again committed 
murder.272 
The new statute lowered the age for both mandatory and discretionary transfer 
and expanded the circumstances under which a judge has no choice but to transfer.273  
The discretionary section of the new statute is similar to the old.  The three 
requirements are identical except for the age, which was lowered from fifteen to 
fourteen.274  Additional factors for the judge to consider have been added, such as 
whether the victim was five years old or younger, whether a gun was used, or 
whether any physical harm resulted.275  Finally, the list of substantive factors 
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(mentioned previously) relating to amenability to rehabilitation was eliminated from 
the juvenile rules of criminal procedure, leaving only procedural requirements.276 
The largest change occurred with the mandatory transfer sections.  If there is 
probable cause to believe a 14-year-old child committed any criminal act, the 
juvenile court judge must transfer if the child was previously found guilty of a felony 
in adult court.277  Ohio is the only state with such a provision.278  If there is probable 
cause to believe a child (fourteen years or older) committed aggravated murder or 
murder, he or she must be transferred if previously found guilty of murder or other 
enumerated felonies and committed to the Department of Youth Services.279  
If the juvenile has reached sixteen years of age, transfer becomes even easier.280  
If there is probable cause to believe that the juvenile committed aggravated murder 
or murder, the judge must transfer.281  Transfer is also mandatory if there is probable 
cause to believe the juvenile committed felonies such as aggravated robbery, 
aggravated burglary, or kidnapping with the use of a firearm.282  Finally, if the charge 
is as serious as murder or aggravated murder, the child must be transferred if 
previously committed to the Department of Youth Services for either a murder or a 
felony.283 
VII.  ANALYSIS AND PROPOSALS 
This section will begin with an analysis of whether Ohio’s current transfer statute 
reflects a sound understanding of lessons learned from history, the real state of 
juvenile crime, and the cognitive, developmental, and emotional characteristics of 
adolescents.  It will also provide an explanation of the Ohio Criminal Sentencing 
Commission’s alternative to transfer.  Finally, this note will conclude with some 
further recommendations for change. 
A.  Analysis of Ohio’s Changes 
The past shows that there are costs and benefits to different approaches to 
juvenile crime.284  One interpretation of history supports the view that the juvenile 
courts of today have drifted away from the judicial discretion and procedural 
informality that made rehabilitation and treatment a reality.285  Another interpretation 
supports the idea that overly broad and unguided judicial discretion resulted in 
                                                                
276See OHIO JUV. R. 30 (1997) (commentary). 
277§ 2151.26(B)(1). 




282§ 2151.26(B)(4)(b).   
283§ 2151.26(B)(4)(a).   
284See discussion supra Part II. 
285See discussion supra Part II A. 
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arbitrariness, while informal proceedings were neither beneficial, nor an intentional 
alternative to achieving the goal of rehabilitation.286 
Ohio’s statute combines the worst of both worlds.  First, by expanding the reach 
of its mandatory transfer,287 this State has moved further away from taking into 
consideration the different characteristics of each juvenile and their varying degrees 
of culpability.  Conversely, by eliminating some of the guidelines in the Juvenile 
Rules of Criminal Procedure for discretionary transfer,288 the juvenile court judge has 
fewer factors under which to guide a decision, thus broadening the discretion of each 
individual judge. 
Similar to many state juvenile transfer statutes written during the same period, 
the new Ohio transfer statute was the result of exaggerated juvenile crime 
statistics.289 If juvenile crime has indeed reached astronomical levels, the need to 
protect society may outweigh the possible benefits of rehabilitation;290 however, the 
fact that this statute went into effect three years after juvenile crime began to drop291 
shows that Ohio has incorrectly balanced these interests. To properly address the 
actual state of juvenile crime, rehabilitation should have been given greater 
emphasis. 
The Ohio statute, with deterrence as one of its underlying justifications for 
harsher punishment,292 disregards the true nature of adolescents, namely, their 
inability to fully appreciate future consequences.293  Consequently, the threat of being 
tried in an adult court will not have the impact upon juvenile decision-making as 
may be expected.  The Supreme Court discussed deterrent value of the most serious 
punishment imaginable, the sentence of death, upon a fifteen-year-old boy in 
Thompson v. Oklahoma.294 The Court noted “the likelihood that the teenage offender 
has made the kind of cold-blooded, cost-benefit analysis that attaches any weight to 
the possibility of execution is so remote as to be virtually nonexistent. . . .”295  It 
would logically follow then that if death will unlikely deter this group of offenders, 
neither would the threat of adult punishment. 
Finally, the statute, with its mandatory transfer provisions, rather than solving the 
juvenile crime problem, may end up making it worse.296  If a juvenile, who is 
amenable to rehabilitation, is transferred and sentenced in an adult prison to mix with 
adult criminals, there may be negative ramifications for the future of the child, safety 
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of society, and the community’s resources.297  Young offenders sent to adult 
institutions are exposed to the mistreatment and negative influence of older 
offenders.298  The likely, but unfortunate result is not the reformation of the prisoner, 
but a transformation into a hardened criminal.299  Additionally, unless the offender 
has committed first degree murder, he or she will eventually be set free to once again 
pose a threat to community safety.  Community resources will be spent on further 
efforts in apprehending and once again incarcerating the recidivist offender.300 
B.  A New Idea 
The Ohio Criminal Sentencing Commission has come up with a new approach to 
dealing with serious juvenile offenders.  It proposes that Ohio give the juvenile court 
judge the power to impose adult sentences as an alternative to transferring the 
offender to adult court.301  This plan also expands the age boundaries of those subject 
to the juvenile system in both directions.302  The maximum age for juvenile court 
jurisdiction would be extended from twenty-one to twenty-five, while the minimum 
age would drop from twelve to ten years old.303  Another part to this plan proposes 
suspending an adult prison sentence while the offender serves in the juvenile 
system.304  The adult sentence would be invoked if the offender does not reform.305  
This plan presents a unique approach to juvenile crime that may improve the system 
that exists today; however, it is not without faults.  There are negative aspects that 
need to be resolved before the proposal could ever be put into effect. 
A possible advantage of this plan is that it would replace the practice of 
mandatory waiver.306  Accordingly, the juvenile court judge would always be the one 
to determine the course of action most appropriate for each individual.  This will 
prevent minor offenders who may be amenable to treatment from being 
automatically sent to criminal court. 
This plan would also solve the problems associated with punishing the most 
serious young offenders under the current system.  For example, if an extremely 
violent juvenile is sent to the Department of Youth Services, first, he will have little 
or no incentive to improve, knowing that release is imminent on his twenty-first 
birthday.  Second, society’s need for retribution will not be satisfied by what appears 
to be a light sentence imposed for a serious offense.  On the other hand, if the harsh 
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sentence is imposed and the juvenile is sent to criminal court, all possibility for 
rehabilitation is lost and he emerges from incarceration as a career criminal.   
The proposal establishes a middle ground solution.  The juvenile, knowing he 
will be sent to adult prison for a long period of time if he does not change his ways, 
will have some incentive to improve.  Further, society will be more satisfied with a 
mandatory stay until his twenty-fifth birthday and the possible imposition of an adult 
sentence if rehabilitation fails. 
The downside of this proposal is the immense amount of unguided discretion in 
the juvenile court judge. Arbitrariness may result if the judge has no guidance 
regarding the factors to consider (age, background, etc…) when imposing a sentence.  
There also needs to be limits upon the sentence he or she may impose.  Further, if the 
judge has the ability to hand down adult sentences, all of the procedural protections 
of the adult criminal court must be made available in the juvenile system as well, 
including the right to a trial by jury.  The consequence could be an adversarial 
juvenile system, identical to the adult court, focusing on punishment instead of 
rehabilitation. 
C.  Recommendations 
The following recommendations for adjusting the juvenile justice system 
incorporate lessons learned from history, a realistic view of the crime problem, and 
the developmental characteristics of juveniles.  These considerations are essential 
elements in formulating sound juvenile justice policy.  The recommendations also 
incorporate the idea that it is possible to have a system that combines the procedural 
fairness of an adult court proceeding, guided judicial discretion, and the 
rehabilitative goals of the juvenile system. 
As proposed by the Sentencing Commission, it is necessary that the juvenile 
courts broaden the age of those subject to their jurisdiction.  A longer period of time 
spent in the juvenile justice system may provide more of an opportunity for 
intervention while satisfying society’s need for retribution and avoiding the 
disadvantages of adult prisons.  A broader range of juvenile court jurisdiction to 
younger ages will also enable the system to intervene at an earlier point in the child’s 
life when rehabilitation may be most effective. 
When it comes to the guilt or innocence determination, the juvenile court should 
be procedurally identical to the adult criminal court.  As discussed previously in this 
Note, it is unclear whether procedural informality was a necessary or even an 
intended means to achieve the goal of rehabilitation.  There is no reason to believe 
that the focus on rehabilitation will be lost by the addition of fair proceedings.  How 
a court goes about determining guilt should have no bearing upon what is best for 
that child once that determination has been made.  Flexibility may be a factor in the 
sentencing or treatment decision. 
Procedural protections will also make possible the suggestion by the Sentencing 
Commission that Ohio abandon transfer altogether.  Once a juvenile has been found 
guilty of a particular offense, the juvenile court judge is in the best position to decide 
what is the most appropriate course of action because, unlike a statute, he or she can 
take into account the individual characteristics of each juvenile.  This discretion 
should be guided by factors such as age, prior history, background, and family 
environment.  There should also be limitations on the length and conditions of 
certain punishments, especially for particularly young offenders. 
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Again, it is not the procedures that differentiate these two systems, it is the 
underlying goals.307  The criminal system has for the most part given-up on 
rehabilitation and focused entirely on retribution and incapacitation.308  As long as 
the juvenile court system keeps rehabilitation as its objective, it will maintain its 
identity.309 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
One does not need to look very long before finding newspaper articles 
expounding upon all of the new and horrible crimes committed by juveniles.  It is 
also not difficult to find a politician clamoring about how much worse young people 
are today while using these stories as justification for a harsh juvenile policy that has 
not been thoroughly evaluated.  In the wake of misconceived public sentiment about 
the state of juvenile crime today, states have been adjusting their statutes to punish 
more juveniles as adults.  Because of the nature of juveniles, this approach does little 
to advance any goal of the criminal system aside from punishment and retribution.  
The juvenile court is, and should remain, the proper forum for young offenders, no 
matter how serious the crime.  Until it is accepted that procedural due process may 
coexist with the goal of rehabilitation in the juvenile justice system, alternatives to 
transfer will never be a possibility. 
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